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Abstract
What is the connection between reasons and motives? According to Reasons Internalism, there is
a non-trivial conceptual connection between normative reasons and the possibility of rationally
accessing relevant motivation. Reasons Internalism is attractive insofar as it captures the thought
that reasons are for reasoning with and repulsive insofar as it fails to generate sufﬁcient critical
distance between reasons and motives. Rather than directly adjudicate this dispute, I extract from
it two generally accepted desiderata on theories of normative reasons and argue that a new theory
can satisfy both. The new theory locates part of the meaning of normative reason statements in
their role in normative discussion. It generates a view of the connection between reasons and mo-
tives that is distinct from Reasons Internalism, yet distinctively in its spirit.
1. Reasons Internalism
What is the connection between reasons and motives? More precisely, what con-
nection is there, if any, between it being true that A has a normative reason to Φ
and the possibility of A being motivated to Φ? According to Reasons Internalism
there is a non-trivial conceptual connection of the following form:
RI: Necessarily, for all agents A, circumstances C, and actions Φ, A in C has a nor-
mative reason toΦ only if A in C can rationally access the state of being motivated to
Φ from existing motivations.
RI is one way of capturing the thought that agents’ reasons are constrained by
their actual motivations. The constraint is indirect: agents’ reasons are directly
constrained by the outcomes of processes of rational deliberation, but those out-
comes in turn are constrained by agents’ actual motivations. This is in contrast
to the so-called sub-Humean model, which takes reasons to be directly constrained
by agents’ actual motivations (Williams 1981, 101–2; Schroeder 2007). In some
form, RI is accepted by Brandt (1979), Williams (1981, 1989, 1995), Smith
(1995), Setiya (2007, 2014), and Goldman (2009). The aim of this paper is both
to bury and praise it. RI faces serious objections (section 2). But from these objec-
tions I discern general desiderata on theories of normative reasons and construct
an alternative theory which satisﬁes these desiderata (sections 3–4). I label the
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alternative ‘Normative Reason Statement Purposivism’ or NSRP, and its core
claim is that a function of the making of reason statements is to create, via the par-
ticular deliberative mechanism of normative discussion, an appropriate motivation
in the target agent. To help motivate and elucidate this theory, it is ﬁrst necessary
to examine RI.
Several elements of RI need explication. First, a normative reason to Φ is a con-
sideration in favour of Φing, one that makes Φing to some degree justiﬁed, right,
obligatory or ‘to-be-done’ (Scanlon 1997, 19). Second, ‘existing motivations’ re-
fers to the elements of an agent’s subjective motivational set (Williams 1981,
102). These elements may include desires and goals but also “dispositions of eval-
uation, patterns of emotional reaction, personal loyalties and various projects …
embodying commitments of the agent” (Williams 1981, 102). One way of unifying
such states (and avoiding triviality, cf. Korsgaard 1986) is by a common mind-to-
world direction-of-ﬁt: they are psychological states that aim, through prompting
action in consort with relevant beliefs, to impose themselves on the world so as
to have their content realised (Humberstone 1992). Third, to say that A in C can
rationally access a motivational state from existing motivations is to say that A
in C would access that state via a process of sound practical deliberation from
existing motivations. (In what follows, I omit the qualiﬁcation ‘from existing mo-
tivations’ when not salient.) Crucially, Reason Internalists hold that the outcomes
of sound practical deliberation are constrained by the initial motivational set from
which agents deliberate (Lillehammer 2000, 507–8). Finally, I assume that RI
carries with it an implicit explanatory direction from facts about motivation to facts
about reasons. On this interpretation, where A cannot rationally access the motiva-
tion to Φ, it is because of this fact that A has no reason to Φ (Hurley 2001).
Despite appearances, RI is a philosophical hydra, the myriad versions of which
can be distinguished across at least three dimensions. First, regarding the account
of ‘sound practical deliberation’. According to Williams, for example, sound prac-
tical deliberation involves practical reasoning, concerning circumstances C, from
a motivational set that has undergone a purge of relevantly false beliefs. A para-
digm case of such reasoning is “that leading to the conclusion that one has reason
to Φ because Φing would be the most convenient, economical, pleasant etc. way
of satisfying some element in [the agent’s subjective motivational set]” (1981,
104). Other Reason Internalists add further conditions, such as an initial process
of establishing maximal coherence among a set of motivations (Smith 1995,
114–116; Goldman 2009, 57–82) and/or sensitivity to the normative pressures
of others (Bedke 2010, 50–51).
Second, versions of RI can be distinguished according to the nature of the
motivational state accessed. On strong versions, this is the action of Φing or the
intention to Φ (Williams 1989, 35; Shafer-Landau 2003, 170; Bedke 2010, 39).
On weaker versions, it is the state of having some desire or inclination to Φ,
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where this state need not result in Φing or intending to Φ (Smith 1995, 110;
Setiya 2014, 222).
Finally, Reasons Internalists differ regarding what it is to ‘access’ the relevant
motivational state. An ‘ideal’ or ‘fully rational’ version of an agent A – call her
A+ – is one who, faced with the same circumstances, undergoes a process of sound
practical deliberation from existing motivations (Smith 1995, 112–116; Bedke
2010, 41). On a simple ‘exemplar’ model to say that A in C can access a desire
(or intention) to Φ (or Φing) via a process of sound practical deliberation is just
to say that A+ would possess that desire (or intention, or perform that action;
Williams 1989, 35). On a more complex ‘advisor’ view, to say that A in C can
access a desire (or intention) to Φ (or Φing) via a process of sound practical
deliberation is to say that A+ would want A, as she was in the original circum-
stances, to possess that desire (or intention, or perform that action; Smith 1995,
112). In contrast, according to the ‘imaginative projection’ account, to say that A
in C can access a motive (or intention) to Φ (or the act of Φing) via a process of
sound practical deliberation is to say that A+ would want for herself to have that
motive (or intention, or perform that action) were she in A’s actual circumstances
(Bedke 2010, 43).
2. Relevance, attractions, detractions
Though it glosses much detail, the foregoing is enough to help discern the rele-
vance, attractions and detractions of Reasons Internalism.
First, relevance. Quite apart from its acting as a substantive constraint on what
reasons there are, Reasons Internalism is one part of an attractive yet seemingly
inconsistent triad (Brink 1997). The two other elements are:
Moral Rationalism. Necessarily, if A in C is morally required to Φ, then A in C has
normative reason to Φ.
Moral Absolutism. Moral requirements are not contingent upon the actual motiva-
tional set of the agents to whom they apply.
If Reasons Internalism and Moral Rationalism are true, then an agent can be mor-
ally required to Φ only if that agent can rationally access the state of being moti-
vated to Φ from existing motivations. Hence the contents of moral requirements
on a given agent are contingent upon her existing motivations (Harman 1975).
Not only is this contingency troubling in itself, it seems to conﬂict with the basic
tenets of moral realism (Shafer-Landau 2003, 170). Similarly, if Reasons
Internalism and Moral Absolutism are true then normative reasons are, whereas
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moral requirements are not, contingent on the motivational set of the agents to
whom they apply, and hence moral requirements cannot entail normative reasons
(Foot 1972; Williams 1981, 110). There follows a surprising result concerning
the authority of morality: moral requirements need not be something that we have
reason to follow (Shafer-Landau 2003, 192–193). Finally, if Moral Rationalism
and Moral Absolutism are true then at least some reasons, viz., those that accom-
pany moral requirements, are not contingent on the actual motivational sets of
agents.
This last option might seem the most appealing were it not for certain consid-
erations which seem to favour Reasons Internalism. No doubt one motivation for
accepting Reasons Internalism is the desire to show that those who fail to act in
accordance with their strongest reasons are in some way acting against their own
motivationally enshrined interests – a desire to hit them where it hurts, as Foot
puts it (1978, 152). But as an argument this is liable to backﬁre, since accepting
Reasons Internalism might equally warrant the conclusion that agents have fewer
reasons than was previously thought, precisely because many of these putative
reasons do not relate in the right sort of way to agents’ existing concerns. A
stronger argument can be mounted on the basis of an apparent conceptual con-
nection between reasons and practical deliberation, that is, reasoning about what
to do and feel. Many have suggested that one function of reasons is to guide ac-
tion by providing considerations that agents can deliberatively cognise: reasons
are for reasoning with. As Wong puts it: “what point could a reason have if it
is not capable of motivating the agent who has it?” (2006, 540; cf. Lillehammer
2003, 42). Reasons Internalism is one way of capturing the required connection
here, since rationally accessing the state of being motivated to Φ requires the rel-
evant idealised agent to deliberatively cognise the consideration presented by the
relevant reason. Note, however, that whilst this line of thought suggests a con-
nection between reasons and deliberation, Reasons Internalism adds the further
claim that deliberation proceeds from, and is constrained by, existing motiva-
tional sets. To secure this result, one can add the plausible thought that practical
deliberation requires motivational input – some salient goal or end to reasons
towards – and that only existing elements of agents’ subjective motivational sets
can provide that input (Williams 1981, 109; Milgram 1996, 198). These claims
granted, Reasons Internalism is supported insofar as it provides a plausible expla-
nation of the generally acknowledged connection between reasons and practical
deliberation.
Yet Reasons Internalism also has detractions. First, it seems vulnerable to coun-
terexample insofar as we can conceive of cases where agents have normative rea-
son to Φ and yet they cannot rationally access the state of being motivated to Φ.
Cases of conscientious objectors (Williams 1981, 106), unrepentant wife-beaters
(Wong 2006, 540), neglectful parents (Schroeder 2007, 103) and indifferent
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stairwell dwellers (Bedke 2010, 53) all ﬁt this description. A recent example
comes from Shafer-Landau (2009, 190):
Consider an experienced torturer working on behalf of an authoritarian government.
Such a person not only endorses the legitimacy of the regime, but takes active plea-
sure in breaking his victims. His greatest joy is stripping the last vestiges of dignity
from those who initially resist his demands. At a given session, as he is about to ap-
ply the electrodes, he pauses to consider the merits of his action. He sees that doing
so will get him what he most wants, and will frustrate none of his desires. He pro-
ceeds accordingly.
Here it seems that the torturer has a reason not to apply the electrodes and yet no
amount of sound practical deliberation can lead him to access a motivation to re-
frain. (This last is contentious, of course, given the chronic under-description of
both the torturer’s psychology and the process of sound practical deliberation.
But I put this to one side for now.) Hence, it seems, Reasons Internalism is false.
Some might worry that this argument is vulnerable insofar as it relies on intu-
itive judgements about reasons that beg the question (Shafer-Landau 2009, 192)
or are not universally shared (Lillehammer 2000, 508) or reﬂect views on what
it is expedient to say about reasons, rather than what it is correct to say (Williams
1981, 111; 1989, 40). But whatever its other failures, the objection here need not
rely solely on intuition, for the judgements in these cases can in turn be explained
in terms of another plausible claim about the function of normative reasons. This
is the claim that part of the function of such reasons is to provide a degree of crit-
ical distance from the existing motivational states of agents. The thought is that a
function of reasons is not just to reﬂect the ways in which agents are already
incentivised to act, in virtue of their subjective motivational set, but to provide
considerations that can form the basis of criticism of that set; criticisms that point
the agent in new and better directions. As McDowell puts it: “Reason-giving ex-
planations require a conception of how things ideally would be, sufﬁciently inde-
pendent of how any individual’s psychological economy operates to serve as the
basis for a critical assessment of it” (1995, 76; cf. Thomas 2006, 86; Wong
2006, 537). It is just this independence that is displayed in our intuitive judge-
ments about the reasons of torturers and the like.
Reasons Internalists are aware of this problem and it is in fact partly because of
it that they accept a view which moves beyond the sub-Humean model. Reasons
Internalism does not constrain agents’ reasons by their motivations as they stand
but by the motivations they can access after sound practical deliberation. Such a
process can involve correcting for errors of fact and mistakes of reasoning. Ac-
cordingly Reasons Internalism can allow some critical distance between the
agents’ reasons and their current motivational sets. As Williams notes, “this is
… enough for the notion [of a reason] to be normative” (1989, 36).
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However, one might worry that this manoeuvre fails to provide sufﬁcient crit-
ical distance (McDowell 1995, 77; Wong 2006, 551). According to the current
view, there is no scope for normative reasons to provide critical perspectives
on sets of motivations that agents would possess after undergoing sound practi-
cal deliberation from existing motivations. It is plausible that a function of rea-
sons is to provide precisely this type of normativity, that is, to “provide a
basis from which to criticize … desire on the most fundamental levels” (Wong
2006, 551). It is this phenomenon that is arguably on display in our judgements
concerning agents such as Shafer-Landau’s torturer, for though they are speciﬁed
in ways which suggest they have engaged in sound practical deliberation, there
is an obvious sense in which we can be critical of them, and critical in a way that
appeals to considerations for and against actions – reasons – which they ignore
(Shafer-Landau 2009, 190–191, 201). It follows not that all normative reasons
reach beyond the motivations that can be accessed after sound practical deliber-
ation, but that some do. This is nevertheless sufﬁcient to refute Reasons
Internalism.
These considerations generate an impasse. On the one hand, the idea that a
function of reasons is to provide inputs into practical deliberation provides
abductive support for Reasons Internalism. On the other, the idea that a function
of reasons is to provide a critical perspective on motivational sets suggests that
Reasons Internalism is false. Rather than take sides in this debate, I propose a con-
cessive strategy. Each of the above arguments can be understood as drawing plau-
sibility from an implicitly understood desideratum on successful theories of
normative reasons. My strategy is to tease out these desiderata and consider
whether a single theory can satisfy both.
First, then, consider the argument in favour of Reasons Internalism. This draws
its plausibility from the following (pro tanto) desideratum:
D1. A theory of reasons should accommodate the thought that one function of rea-
sons is to provide inputs into practical deliberation.
The argument against Reasons Internalism suggests a distinct desideratum:
D2. A theory of reasons should accommodate the thought that one function of rea-
sons is to provide critical distance from agents’ motivations (both as they are now,
and as they would be after sound practical deliberation).
In fact, these desiderata can be understood in a complementary way, for D1 pro-
vides a partial speciﬁcation of the mechanism whereby the mode of criticism re-
ferred to in D2 might come to affect agents’ motivations. It is important,
though, not to misunderstand the strength of these desiderata. The arguments in
their favour do not support the view that these claims exhaust the functions of
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reasons. The case in support of D2 does not support the view that every reason is
part of a critical perspective distanced from agents’ actual motivations. Likewise
the argument that supports D1 does not support the claim that every reason is an
input into practical deliberation (after all, reasons can go unrecognised). But, so
understood, D1 and D2 seem to capture two plausible thoughts about the nature
of reasons, at least as reﬂected in existing debates.
3. Williams and normative discussion
In sections 4 and 5 I will put forward a theory of reasons – NSRP – that seems to
capture what is plausible about D1 and D2. One way to approach this theory is
by ﬁrst considering Williams’ famous argument for Reasons Internalism. Though
there is considerable controversy regarding the interpretation of Williams’ views
(e.g. Thomas 2006, 69–81; Finlay 2009), a brief detour through some of these
debates will be helpful to elaborate the key notion of normative discussion which
features in NSRP.
Williams uses the phrase ‘external reason’ to refer to any (putative) reason that
needn’t (in order to be a reason) satisfy the necessary condition laid down by Rea-
sons Internalism and ‘internal reason’ to refer to any (putative) reason that does need
(in order to be a reason) to satisfy this condition (cf. Finlay 2009, 17). Thus the de-
bate about Reasons Internalism can be understood as the debate about the existence
of external reasons. On the traditional yet controversial interpretation of Williams’
argument against external reasons, there are two key premises.1 The ﬁrst is the so-
called explanatory constraint: that a putative reason is a reason for an agent only if
that agent would, if ideally rational, be appropriately motivated by believing in that
reason (Williams 1981, 106; 1989, 39; cf. Thomas 2006, 69–70; Finlay 2009, 3–4).
The second is the claim that an agent can, if ideally rational, be appropriately moti-
vated by believing in a reason only if she antecedently has some motivational state
that could bring it about that she be so motivated (Williams 1981, 109; cf. Finlay
2009, 4). On this interpretation, Williams’ second premise presents a Humean in-
strumentalist conception of rationality: the view that “practical reason cannot by it-
self produce or entail amotive, butmerely facilitates ﬂowofmotivational force from
pre-existing desires, channelling it from one object to another” (Finlay 2009, 4).
So understood, Williams’ argument has multiple detractors. Many have pointed
out that it is question-begging to assume an instrumentalist conception of rational-
ity in the course of an argument against external reasons (Finlay 2009, 4), as the
defender of external reasons will prefer a substantive theory according to which
an agent can be rational so long as she appropriately responds to her reasons,
1 For examples of the traditional interpretation, see Korsgaard (1986), Hooker (1987), Smith
(1995), and Shafer-Landau (2003, 172). For controversy, see Thomas (2006, 69–81), Finlay (2009).
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regardless of such reasons’ instrumental connection to an initial motivational set.
So, for example, a previously callous agent who comes, via a process of non-de-
liberative conversion, to be appropriately motivated by a belief about the reason-
giving nature of others’ pain, can be rational even if, pre-conversion, she had no
desire-like state that could ground this motivation (McDowell 1995, 74). Other
critics of Williams’ apparent instrumentalism attempt to provide more detail about
the sorts of non-instrumentalist processes that might be involved in rational delib-
eration. Milgram, for example, emphasises the role of ‘tutelage of experience’. He
elaborates:
… just as reasoning can be practical as well as theoretical, so experience can be prac-
tical too. Using ‘fact’ and ‘value’ for a moment as contrasting terms, we can say that
there may be no relevant fact about the upcoming situation of which I am unaware,
and there may be no element of my [subjective motivational set] that I am unable to
deploy deliberatively, but this does not mean that I can know what it will be like liv-
ing through it. One reason for this is that what something is like is, often enough and
in large part, a matter of my evaluation of it; and it is this evaluative aspect of what it
is like that makes what it is like not simply a further fact available to the internalist.
(1996, 207)
For example:
Imagine someone brought up on the pleasures of light verse … We might call a
strong appreciation for the accomplishments of lesser poems … a component of
his [subjective motivational set]. Now suppose he is directed to a passage such as,
say, the second part of Yeats’ ‘A Dialogue of the Self and Soul’. It is characteristic
of such poems that appropriate reactions to them are complex and not easily summa-
rized, but we may suppose that one component of his reaction amounts to, ‘I had no
idea a poem could be like that’, and that his [subjective motivational set] now con-
tains desires to read more poetry of this kind. (1996, 211)
One issue arising is whether such experiential tutelage is distinct from ‘sound
practical deliberation’ of the sort Williams (on the instrumentalist interpretation)
countenances. Williams takes the latter notion to be somewhat indeterminate, with
“no ﬁxed boundaries on the continuum from rational thought to inspiration and
conversion” (1981, 110). Nevertheless, as Milgram (1996, 210–212) notes, it is
suggestive of a Humean interpretation that all of Williams’ examples of sound
practical reasoning are instrumental, that is, aimed at ﬁnding ways of satisfying
(or promoting) elements of one’s existing motivational set. In the poetry example,
the derivation of new motivations does not seem to be instrumental in this way
(for a further example, see Wong 2006, 539 ff.)
Are there further examples or non-instrumental rationality? One striking fact
about the types of rational deliberation so far discussed is that they are all essen-
tially private, that is, they describe processes that agents go through without direct
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interaction with other agents. Williams’ agents consider the best way to satisfy an-
tecedent desires; Milgram’s agent reads a poem. But, face-to-face conversing with
other agents about what to do, what ought to be done and what reasons there are in
the case at hand is a typical, perhaps the typical, way in which agents come to re-
vise their views about their reasons. Consider the following example.
Sally, Elke and Luna are members of an academic department deciding whether or
not to institute a policy of anonymous marking. Sally thinks anonymous marking re-
ally ought to be implemented, and cites in support the possibility of implicit biases
that can affect non-anonymous marking. Elke disagrees, claiming: “We ought not
to do this, it would undermine a vital type of rapport that is essential in any good
teacher–student relationship”. Luna is initially undecided, but notes that “The new
system would have huge administrative costs, and we should think carefully about
the effect of extra workload on overworked administrators.” After much discussion
they decide that they have most reason to implement anonymous marking.
Sally, Elke and Luna are engaged in an activity that can be labelled ‘normative
discussion’ (cf. Gibbard 1990). Such discussion aims at consensus regarding what
to do or feel and involves as a crucial part agents citing putative reasons (e.g. “this
would undermine rapport”) in the hope or expectation that other agents will come
to be moved by the considerations therein presented. In some, but not all, cases,
this will result in a change in motivational proﬁle consequent on (or simultaneous
with) the acquisition of a new reason-belief.
If we suppose the case described to be at all representative of the actual, messy,
ways in which agents collectively deliberate about what to do, it is plausible that
some of the motivational shifts that result are instances of rational deliberation.
Consider Elke, who is not initially motivated in favour of anonymous marking.
After the discussion she comes to believe that she has a reason to support anony-
mous marking. Her case can plausibly be described as ‘considering the matter
aright’ (Williams 1981, 108–109) via a respectable mechanism, namely the
mechanism of reﬂectively engaging in normative discussion. This mechanism also
seems to be distinct from instrumental deliberation from existing motivations – for
on at least one way ﬁlling in the details of this scenario, it is not that Elke now sup-
ports anonymous marking because she has come to believe that it is in fact the best
way to promote her antecedent goal of teacher–student rapport; rather, the interac-
tion with her colleagues has caused Elke to reassess he priorities and acquire new
non-instrumentally derived motivations, so that she now places teacher–student
rapport as only one concern among others. So described, we seem to have another
– socialised – counterexample to instrumentalism.
The idea of mechanisms whereby agents’ motivations are directly sensitive to
the normative pressures of others is familiar from other contexts. As Bedke
(2010, 51) notes, the experiments of Milgram (1974) and others suggest that
humans possess motivational mechanisms that “take certain pressures from others
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as input and output novel motivations or motivational strengths”. Such mecha-
nisms also have a key role in Haidt and Bjorklund’s empirically grounded theory
of moral judgement, which postulates a ‘reasoned persuasion link’, whereby
moral judgements are used to persuade others to share the motivational tendencies
of the speaker and “rhetoric is the art of pushing the ever-evaluating mind over to
the side the speaker wants it to be on” (2008, 192).
This mention of compliance with authority and rhetoric might ring alarm bells.
Williams explicitly rules out being “persuaded by … moving rhetoric” (1981,
108) as an acceptable, rational, way of coming to be moved by one’s reasons. If
the type of motivational inﬂuence present in normative discussion is no more than
being persuaded by rhetoric or blindly following the demands of an authority, then
Williams might rightly argue that this is not an instance of practical rationality at
all. But it is useful to distinguish here. Rhetoric and demands from authority have
two salient elements. First, they are most commonly parts of attempts to change
the motivational proﬁles of others. Second, their method is in an important sense
‘non-deliberative’. That is, they hope to affect this change not by drawing atten-
tion to pre-existing features of the situation, but, in the case of rhetoric, by using
emotive language intended to directly elicit the required reaction and in the case of
demands from authority by making the demand itself the reason for compliance
(‘Because he told me to’). In this way, both are examples of what Falk (1953) la-
bels ‘goading’. What Falk contrastively labels ‘guiding’ shares the ﬁrst but not the
second feature. In guiding, agents attempt to change the motivations of others by
drawing their attention to features of the situation that exist independently of any
demand being made, in the hope that the target agent will recognise their norma-
tive and hence motivational salience (i.e. come to judge that they are reason-giv-
ing and be motivated accordingly). In guiding, the persuasive force which the
utterance has relies on what it says, rather than on simply being the making of a
demand. On this taxonomy, the type of motivational inﬂuence in play in norma-
tive discussion is paradigmatically guiding rather than goading (although no doubt
actual normative discussion typically involves both types of inﬂuence). That is to
say, normative discussion seeks to alter agents’ motivations in part by adducing
independent considerations that can subsequently be cited as reasons in support
of those motivations.
This point allows a response to the problem raised in the previous paragraph.
The comparison with rhetoric and adherence to authority is useful insofar as it
demonstrates the empirical possibility of a type of mechanism for generating mo-
tivations that goes beyond instrumental deliberation from existing motivations.
Most generally, these are mechanisms which take contributions from others as in-
puts and output novel (i.e. non-instrumentally connected) motivations. But Bedke
and others seem over-hasty to claim that the very same mechanisms at play in rhe-
toric and adherence to authority are at play in normative discussion. Both types of
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mechanism allow for the contributions of others to generate novel motivations, but
the latter involves guiding rather than (mere) goading.
All of this spells trouble for the defender of Reasons Internalism who takes
what is ‘rationally accessible’ to be limited to what is accessible by instrumentalist
reasoning from existing motivations. Such a Humean conception of a ‘sound de-
liberative route’ is put under severe pressure by these apparently non-instrumen-
talist ways of ‘rationally accessing’ relevant motivation.
How might Williams, or his defenders, respond? One option is to cry foul on
the point of interpretation. As previously noted, it is a matter of considerable con-
temporary controversy whether Williams did in fact base his case against external
reasons on instrumentalism. Finlay, for example, has given persuasive arguments
for thinking that Williams’ argument is based rather on the point that the concept
of a (practical) reason just is the concept of an explanation of action under the con-
dition of sound reasoning (Finlay 2009, 13–19; cf. Thomas 2006, 69–75). On this
account, Williams would insist that the reasons we have are constrained by what is
accessible by sound practical deliberation from where we begin, but would adopt a
more expansive conception of such deliberation that could include, for example,
the type of reasoning involved in the case of Elke et al.
Issues of interpreting Williams aside, such a version of Reasons Internalism has
recently been defended by Bedke. The key to this position is the claim that the per-
suasive mechanisms involved in normative discussion are included as instances of
practical deliberation that deﬁne the limits of rational accessibility. More precisely,
on Bedke’s view, A has reason to Φ only if A+ would want for herself to Φ were
she in A’s actual circumstances (2010, 43–44). Crucially, the norms of rationality
that A+ internalises are not purely instrumental, for they include the norm of being
sensitive to the legitimate normative pressures of others, where this normative
pressure is precisely the kind of pressure exerted in the ‘guiding’ sort of discussion
described above (2010, 48–53).
Such a move may seem ad hoc, for what justiﬁcation could there be to include
following this norm of ‘social rationality’ in the account of what constitutes ideal
rationality? Bedke’s answer is the ‘promotion account’, which holds that a norm is
a norm of rationality “because, when embodied in one’s psychology, it promotes
the objects of one’s motivations, or more narrowly ends, in the kinds of circum-
stances in which the agent typically ﬁnds himself” (2010, 48). This, Bedke claims,
explains why the types of deliberation Williams focuses on count as following
norms of rationality (2010, 49). But it also explains why a degree of sensitivity
to the type of inﬂuence that occurs in normative discussion counts as following
a norm of rationality: “By participating in certain normative pressures, the objects
of antecedent motivations are likely to be served, whatever they happen to be, for
the objects of most motivations cannot be served at all, or easily served, without a
supportive social environment” (2010, 52).
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This socialised Reasons Internalism certainly nulliﬁes the case of Elke et al. as
a potential counterexample. But is it plausible? Bedke argues that it goes some
way to dealing with the problem generated by apparently external reasons, such
as the torturer’s reason to stop torturing (section 2). He considers the case of Andy,
“who doesn’t care about strangers in a burning building as he ﬁnds himself alone
in a stairwell next to a ﬁre alarm”:
… imagine that Andy+ is somewhat sensitive to the normative pressures of others.
The suggestion … is that Andy+ is not fully ideally rational unless he includes
the idealization of the norms by which Andy is sensitive to the legitimate norma-
tive pressures of others ... If this dimension of rationality is included, there will
likely be an ideal version of Andy who would want for himself to pull the ﬁre
alarm were he in Andy’s shoes, viz. a version of Andy that has been hypotheti-
cally subjected to normative pressures to save the strangers in the building.
(2010, 53)
Thus this version of Reasons Internalism is consistent with the claim that Andy
has a reason to pull the alarm.
On reﬂection, however, problems arise. We are asked to imagine that Andy+ is
hypothetically subjected to the (legitimate) normative pressures of others. But
which others? If we suppose that the relevant others are those representing the in-
terests of the people in the burning building, then it seems likely that Andy+ would
want for himself to pull the alarm, were he in Andy’s shoes. But if we suppose the
relevant others to be some totalitarian group (of which Andy is an enthusiastic
member) dedicated to the eradication of the type of people occupying the build-
ing, it seems just as likely that Andy+ would not want for himself to pull the
alarm, were he in Andy’s shoes. Which hypothetical normative pressures are rel-
evant to Andy’s reasons? Note that one thing that Bedke cannot say is that the rel-
evant pressures are those applied by people who correctly perceive the reasons in
the case. For, as he notes (2010, 45), if one wishes to employ Reasons Internalism
as a non-trivial constraint on reasons, one cannot rely on a conception of rational-
ity according to which what counts as rational is simply a matter of responding ap-
propriately to reasons.
More plausibly then, Bedke could argue that the relevant others are those indi-
viduals present in the social environment in which Andy (typically) ﬁnds himself.
On this view, we hypothetically subject Andy+ to the normative pressure of agents
taken from Andy’s milieu. This would include the normative pressure of the
agents in the burning building. It seems right that if these are the only agents hy-
pothetically subjecting Andy+ to normative pressure, then Andy+ would want
himself to pull the alarm, were he in Andy’s shoes. But suppose, as before, that
Andy’s actual situation is that he (contentedly) lives in a totalitarian state domi-
nated by a group whose explicit goals involve the eradication of people such as
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those in the burning building. On the current account, the normative pressures of
these agents are included in the relevant hypothetical scenario, and, given certain
assumptions about the pervasiveness and stability of the totalitarian state, it seems
likely that in this case, Andy+ would want for himself not to pull the alarm, were
he in Andy’s shoes. Yet, intuitively, even in this case, Andy still has a reason to
pull the alarm (suppose that doing so would activate the building’s sprinklers,
for example). This case therefore seems to be a counterexample even to the more
inclusive version of Reasons Internalism that Bedke prefers.
Can we offer a diagnosis? The socialised view seems promising insofar as it
recognises a connection between reasons and the deployment of those reasons
in normative discussion. But in accepting the promotion account of rationality,
the view also explicitly takes an instrumentalist ﬂavour – for on that account, en-
gagement in normative discussion is ultimately justiﬁed in virtue of its propensity
to better satisfy one’s antecedent motivations (in a social environment). The prob-
lem arises because even in the social environment an agent faces, these antecedent
desires might best be served by being motivated in ways in which one intuitively
has no reason to be motivated. The social view still fails to provide the requisite
critical distance.
4. Normative Reason Statement Purposivism
The foregoing emphasises a tight connection between reasons and the process of
giving and asking for reasons in normative discussion. But it seems that incorpo-
rating this thought into the formulation of Reasons Internalism is unsuccessful. It
is worthwhile, therefore, to consider the possibility of alternatives that build on the
insight without falling prey to the same mistakes.
In her seminal paper, Foot remarks that “I do not understand the idea of a rea-
son for acting, and I wonder whether anyone else does either” (1978, 156). Earlier,
I expressed D1 and D2 in terms of the ‘functions’ of reasons. This seems to com-
pound Foot’s problem: if reasons are obscure, their functions are doubly-so. But
we can avoid both worries by switching focus from reasons to statements of rea-
sons (e.g. Williams 1981, 101; Thomas 2006, 69), and take our intuitions in cases
such as Shafer-Landau’s torturer to concern not the existence of reasons, but the
appropriateness of making reason statements. Let us say that to make a normative
reason statement is to sincerely utter a sentence of the form ‘F is a reason for A to
Φ’ or ‘A has a reason to Φ’, where ‘reason’ is used normatively. In this light, we
can recast D1 and D2 as follows:
D1*. A theory of normative reason statements should accommodate the thought that
a function of such statements is to provide inputs into practical deliberation.
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D2*. A theory of normative reason statements should accommodate the thought
that a function of such statements is to provide critical distance from agents’ moti-
vations (both as they are now, and as they would be after sound practical
deliberation).
We can now consider whether a theory can be constructed precisely to meet these
desiderata. One good place to start is to consider how such statements are used, in
particular, in the context of normative discussion. Consider the following:
Normative Reason Statement Purposivism (NRSP): Necessarily, a function of reason
statements of the form ‘A has (normative) reason to Φ’ (etc.) is to deliberatively cre-
ate in A some motivation to Φ.
Here ‘deliberatively create’ means ‘create through the guiding mechanisms partly
constitutive of normative discussion’, understanding normative discussion in the
ways elaborated above. These mechanisms are ones of guiding insofar as they in-
volve the presentation of independent considerations which, if things go well,
bring forth in the target agent an appropriate motivation. This motivational shift
can occur in one of at least two ways. In the ﬁrst type of case, reason statements
create motivational shifts by engaging with existing motivations, highlighting
paths of actions which are incentivised in light of those motivations and citing fea-
tures which help explain why this is so. In the second type of case, whose possi-
bility is suggested by the previous account of normative discussion, reason
statements do not engage with existing motivations in the same way, but do hope
to be part of a guiding process whereby novel motivations arise.
NRSP also talks of a ‘function’ of normative reason statements. The sense of
function here is semantic: that reason statements have this function is a feature
of their conventionally enshrined meaning, in the same way that the meaning of
imperatives, say, is partly deﬁned by their function of producing compliance.
According to NRSP, when a sincere speaker makes a normative reason state-
ment, the conventions surrounding the use of such statements mean that those
who understand the speaker take them to be attempting to deliberatively alter
the target’s motivational set. A natural corollary of NRSP is the further claim
that normative reason statements sometimes fulﬁl this semantic function, in
such a way that it is also an aetiological function, that is, an effect that such
statements have had in the past which explains the continued proliferation of
tokens of that type.
Is NRSP plausible? Consider D1* and D2*. According to NRSP, a function of
reason statements is to deliberatively create new motives, and they fulﬁl this func-
tion, when they do, by providing inputs into the deliberation of target agents.
Hence D1* is satisﬁed. Insofar as such statements hope to fulﬁl this function via
the ﬁrst type of ‘guiding’ mentioned above, there will be distance from the target
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agents’ current motivations; insofar as reason statements hope to fulﬁl this func-
tion via the second type of guidance mentioned above, there will be distance from
the target agents’ motivations even as they would be after sound practical deliber-
ation. Hence D2* is satisﬁed. The fact that NRSP can capture these plausible
thoughts about the functions of reason statements is one important argument in
its favour.
5. NRSP and the connection between reasons and motives
Return to the original question: What is the connection between it being true that
A has a reason to Φ and the possibility of A being motivated to Φ? Given the id-
iom-shift of the last section, the question becomes: What connection is there be-
tween the appropriateness of a statement of the form ‘A has (normative) reason
to Φ’ (etc.) and the possibility of A being motivated to Φ?
NRSP assigns a semantic function to normative reason statements. If a partic-
ular type of reason statement (e.g. ‘You have reason to leave’) is to fulﬁl this func-
tion, some of its tokens must deliberatively create a relevant motive. It follows that
if a particular type of reason statement cannot in this way deliberatively create this
motive, then it cannot fulﬁl this function. Assuming that a statement that cannot
fulﬁl one of its semantic functions is in that respect not semantically appropriate,
it follows that where there is no possibility of a particular type of normative reason
statement deliberatively creating the relevant motive, then that particular type of
statement is, in one respect, semantically inappropriate. In other words, given
these assumptions, NRSP entails the following claim (mildly reminiscent of Rea-
sons Internalism):
RI-ish: Necessarily, statements of the form ‘A has (normative) reason to Φ’ (etc.) are
in one sense semantically appropriate only if the making of such statements can de-
liberatively create in A some motivation to Φ.2
Here ‘in one sense semantically appropriate’ means ‘appropriate in light of the se-
mantic function assigned by NRSP’. According to RI-ish there is a necessary con-
nection between a type of normative reason statement being in some sense
semantically appropriate and the (historical and nomological) possibility of target
agents being relevantly motivated by statements of that very type. Consider, for
example, Shafer-Landau’s torturer. Suppose that it is simply not possible (given
the history of the world and the laws of nature) that the torturer come to be
2 I take this view to have close afﬁnities with the version of Reasons Internalism defended by
Manne (2014).
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motivated to stop torturing on the basis of other agents exerting normative pres-
sures on him, for example by making reason statements such as: ‘The pain you’re
causing is a very good reason to stop torturing, you know.’ Then, according to
RI-ish, there is at least one sense in which such statements are not semantically
appropriate (note that other types of evaluative statements may be available –
see next paragraph). At this point, we may need to deal with the torturer in ways
other than engaging him in normative discussion. Williams (1981, 43) labels such
characters “hopeless or dangerous”.
Crucially, in comparison with Williams’ version of Reasons Internalism,
RI-ish extends the ‘critical distance’ between agents’ existing motivational sets
and their reasons in two key ways. First and most importantly, it allows that
agents’ reasons are not in any way constrained by their initial motivational sets.
Although Williams’ Reasons Internalism does not limit reasons to initial moti-
vations, it does limit reasons to the outcomes of sound practical deliberation,
and those outcomes are constrained by the agent’s initial motivational set (see
sections 1 and 3). RI-ish, on the other hand, limits agents’ reasons only to what
can be reached after engagement with normative discussion – there is no re-
quirement that the outcomes of that process be restricted by initial motivations.
Second, by explicitly including interpersonal normative discussion in the types
of processes that might be involved in sound practical deliberation, RI-ish pro-
vides more critical distance than Williams’ view even on the assumption (which
it rejects) that the outcomes of sound practical deliberation are constrained by
existing motivations. For, as previously noted (section 3), Williams’ view of
sound practical deliberation is distinctively private – it involves no interpersonal
normative discussion. As it is plausible that one can reach further from initial
motivations by a process that includes interpersonal normative discussion than
by a process that excludes it, including this process in the mechanisms of sound
practical deliberation already increases critical distance between existing moti-
vations and reasons (this was one of the merits of Bedke’s approach, which un-
fortunately failed on other grounds). Combining these two points, the key point
is that unlike all other versions of Reasons Internalism, RI-ish does not tie
agents’ reasons to their existing motivational set – rather it ties agents’ reasons
to their deliberative possibilities (and has a liberal, interpersonal, view of delib-
erative possibilities). Finally, note that neither Williams’ view nor RI-ish are
themselves committed to Moral Rationalism (section 2). If they reject it, then
they can insist that other evaluative judgements (e.g. of wickedness or deprav-
ity) are entirely appropriate of characters like the torturer. For such terms, crit-
ical distance is as great as any party to the debate considers reasonable. On this
view, it is only judgements of reasons which are (somewhat) more restrictive,
but this very restriction is a natural upshot of their particular functional role,
as given by NSRP.
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Some important caveats remain. First, I assumed above that if a particular type
of statement cannot fulﬁl a particular (semantic) function, then it is in that respect
(semantically) inappropriate. But it is not plausible to assume that where a partic-
ular statement does not fulﬁl a particular function, then it is in the same way inap-
propriate. For example, one function of commands is to produce compliance, but
just because a command is not complied with, doesn’t mean it was (with respect to
this function) inappropriate. Likewise, just because a particular reason statement
does not fulﬁl its function of deliberatively creating a relevant motive does not
mean that that reason statement was (with respect to this function) inappropriate.
Consider again Shafer-Landau’s torturer. We saw that if there is no possibility of
him being motivated by normative reason statements, then in one sense those
statements are inappropriate. But suppose that there is some possibility of him be-
ing motivated by such statements, but that after making them on a particular occa-
sion, this possibility is not realised. It does not follow that the statements were
inappropriate. It may be that his interlocutors were justiﬁed in engaging him in
normative discussion insofar as such discussion is a less costly method of securing
the hoped-for social co-ordination (compared, for example, to coercion, brain-
washing or physical restraint), and other things being equal, one is justiﬁed in
deploying less costly methods ﬁrst. On this view, so long as there was at least a
possibility of these reason statements deliberatively creating the relevant motive,
their deployment can still be appropriate (with respect to their NRSP function).
Similarly, even if there is no possibility of the relevant motive being deliberatively
created, but there is some uncertainty about whether this is so, the low cost of rea-
son statements in comparison with alternatives can make their employment
appropriate.
Note, therefore, that on this account there will be some indeterminacy whether
particular reason statements are semantically appropriate (with respect to their
NRSP function). In some cases it may be unclear whether deliberatively creating
the relevant motive is possible. In other cases, it may be clear that this is possible,
but unclear how likely it is. These uncertainties will make (this dimension of) the
semantic appropriateness of the reason statements similarly uncertain. Yet this is a
positive feature of NRSP, since it reﬂects experience concerning reason state-
ments. As Williams puts it, there is some indeterminacy in the way in which
‘the presence of deliberative reasons … fall off in one or another direction’
(1989, 43). For example, it is often worthwhile engaging in normative discussion
with an adult human, but seldom with an obdurate donkey. Yet we should not fool
ourselves by denying that these two exist on a continuous scale of susceptibility to
reasons. Discerning precisely where and how normative discussion – and the rea-
son statements it deploys – becomes redundant is not an easy matter.
A second caveat is that RI-ish relates only to one function of normative reason
statements and leaves open the possibility that such statements have
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complementary functions. With respect to these, it might be that a particular type
of statement is appropriate even if there is no possibility of its tokens delibera-
tively creating the relevant motivational state. For example, an additional function
of normative reason statements may be to signal to third parties what sort of mo-
tivational states one is generally disposed to encourage or discourage. With re-
spect to this signalling function, it might be that particular types of reason
statements are appropriate even when there is no possibility of their tokens delib-
eratively creating the relevant motivational state.
RI-ish therefore provides a nuanced picture which goes some way to explaining
somewhat conﬂicting thoughts about cases like Shafer-Landau’s torturer. If the
torturer is immune to persuasion via normative discussion, there is one sense in
which statements to the effect that he has (normative) reason to stop are inappro-
priate – namely the sense in which they cannot fulﬁl their function of delibera-
tively creating the relevant motivational state. However, if it is unclear whether
the torturer is immune to such persuasion, such statements can be worthwhile in-
sofar as they represent relatively low-cost attempts to induce the relevant state.
Finally, regardless of their possible deliberative effect on the torturer, such
statements may be appropriate with respect to other, for example signalling,
semantic functions.
We can make all these points more vivid by imagining a confrontation with an
ardent opponent of Reasons Internalism. The initial problem, this opponent re-
minds us, is that Reasons Internalism does not generate sufﬁcient critical distance
between an agent’s actual motivations and her reasons. This is perfectly exempli-
ﬁed by the sadistic torturer, who has reasons to stop torturing, yet cannot come to
be appropriately motivated. But, our opponent continues, the move from Reasons
Internalism to RI-ish doesn’t help increase this critical distance at all. For, accord-
ing to RI-ish, if it is the case that we cannot, through the mechanism of normative
discussion, create in the torturer some motive to stop, then it is not semantically
appropriate to assert that he has a reason to stop. But this is (surely!) an appropri-
ate thing to assert. So RI-ish is no better than RI, at least when it comes to provid-
ing appropriate critical distance. To which the defender of RI-ish can reply as
follows. First, we may not be in a position to assuredly know that there is no pos-
sibility of the appropriate motive being deliberatively created in the torturer, espe-
cially if we do not attempt to deliberatively engage him. If we do not know this,
then making the reason statement may still be semantically appropriate (indeed,
it might be appropriate precisely as part of an attempt to ascertain whether the rel-
evant possibility holds). Second RI-ish captures only one dimension of the seman-
tic appropriateness of reason statements. It is possible that such statements
perform other functions (such as signalling), such that, by reference to these func-
tions, the reason statement about the torturer’s reason to stop is appropriate. To put
it brieﬂy if imprecisely: even if the reason statement cannot move the torturer, it
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may be appropriate insofar as it has the potential to move (or reinforce the move-
ments of) others. It is at this point that RI-ish appears more nuanced than the op-
ponents’ position: for it can capture the feeling that although in one sense the
reason statement directed at the torturer is apt, there is another sense in which it
is – for the purposes of rational debate – out of place or futile (after all: why reason
with a donkey?). The mixed reactions here can be traced back to the multiple func-
tions of such statements.
Before concluding, it is worthwhile to consider one potential objection to
NSRP and is corollary RI-ish.3 The objection is targeted at the claim that the
function of reason statements as given by NSRP (viz., that of deliberatively cre-
ating an appropriate motive) is part of the conventionally enshrined meaning of
such statements. The objection is that this cannot be the whole story of their
meaning, because reason statements can also appear unasserted in embedded
contexts (such as in the antecedents of conditionals), where they clearly do
not have this function. This recalls the famous Frege–Geach problem for under-
standing unasserted normative sentences (cf. Schroeder 2008). In response, it is
important to note that NSRP is not intended to be a complete story of the mean-
ing of reason statements of the form ‘A has (normative) reason to Φ’. The claim
that the function of such statements is to deliberatively create motives is com-
patible with a number of (distinct) views about precisely how this function is
realised. It is consistent with NSRP, for example, that reason statements func-
tion semantically to offer some description of a worldly relation (e.g., that A’s
Φing would promote some salient end; cf. Finlay 2014). In this case NSRP
would simply add that the description is offered for the purpose of delibera-
tively creating relevant motivation. On this view, the descriptive or representa-
tional content of reason statements is the uncontroversial basis of explaining
their meaning when embedded. Yet it is also consistent with NSRP that reason
statements possess their NSRP-ascribed function by being expressive of partic-
ular non-cognitive attitudes. In this case, providing an account of the meaning
of reason sentences in embedded contexts will be a matter of adapting the (con-
troversial) general accounts of how expressive meaning can embed (e.g.
Gibbard 1990; Blackburn 1998, 68–77; cf. Schroeder 2008). In the present con-
text, however, this compatibility with both cognitivist and expressivist accounts
of the wider meaning of reason statements is an advantage of NSRP. Insofar as
the task with which we began was to give an account of reasons (or reason
statements) which satisﬁed the two desiderata discernible from existing debates
about Reasons Internalism, a theory which does exactly this while giving no
further hostages to fortune is surely preferable. It seems that NSRP is such a
theory.
3 My thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing me on this point.
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6. Conclusion
When it comes to characterising the connection between reasons and motives,
Reasons Internalism is on shaky ground. Although it provides a plausible explana-
tion of the thought that reasons are for reasoning with, it fails to allow for the req-
uisite critical distance between some agents’ reasons and their existing motives.
This is so, I have argued, even in the case of the social type of Reasons Internalism
suggested by Bedke. I have suggested that a theory that focuses instead on the (se-
mantic) functions of normative reason statements goes some way to explaining the
sometimes tenuous connection between the appropriateness of making such state-
ments and the possibility of appropriate motivation in the target agent. According
to that theory, reason statements cannot serve one of their functions (and hence
cannot be in that sense appropriate) unless the target agent possesses some pre-
existing propensity to be swayed by the making of them. This dimension of appro-
priateness therefore gives one sense in which ‘reasons’ are dependent on the
motivational propensities (broadly construed) of target agents. But this is far from
the sense suggested by Reasons Internalism.
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